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Farm revenue insurance has public appeal as a potential means to reduce annual 
variation in farm income while also reducing the cost of commodity programs. For some 
time, economists have been attracted to the idea of farm revenue insurance as a policy 
instrument addressing farm economic instability. Public enthusiasm for the idea intensified 
after endorsement by the Iowa 1995 Farm Bill Study Team. The broad appeal of the 
proposal was apparent: it had the support of 11 organizations ranging in philosophy from 
the Iowa Farm Bureau to the National Farmers Organization. 
This paper lists advantages and disadvantages of revenue insurance. Preliminary 
empirical analysis suggests how that program may affect farm income associated with various 
crops and regions. We conclude with a proposal to make revenue insurance workable as 
an income insurance program administered through the federal income tax. 
Iowa Revenue Assurance Proposal 
Features 
The 1995 Iowa Farm Bill Study Team's revenue assurance (RA) proposal contains 
the following features: 
• The program replaces deficiency payments, Federal Crop Insurance (FCI), and ad 
hoc disaster programs. 
• The Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) nonrecourse loan program and farmer 
owned reserve (FOR) would continue to function as under current legislation. 
• The program covers crops but not livestock. An early draft called for coverage of 
all crops, but a recent proposal calls for coverage only of grains (except rice) and major 
oilseeds. 
• No crop acreage reduction programs (ARPs) are used, although some form of the 
Conservation Reserve Program might be retained. Each producer is free to plant any crop 
in any amount. 
• Over time each producer proves a yield for each crop grown on that farm. 
• Each producer is assured of at least 70 3 of their normal crop revenue based on 
a five-year past average. 
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• Taxpayers would finance the base 70 % revenue protection, but producers would 
have the option of purchasing a higher level of protection. 
• Revenue assurance payments would not be subject to limits by size. 
Unanswered Questions 
The Iowa proposal leaves several questions unanswered: 
• How would yields be established for each crop while a yield history is being 
proved? 
• How are program prices and acreages established? 
• Would producers who feed their crops to livestock be treated the same as 
producers who market their crops for cash? 
• How, if at all, would revenue history be adjusted for production ansmg from 
changes in double cropping, irrigation, rotations, drainage, or other cultural practices? Such 
changes could materially affect payments. 
• How would revenue history be established for beginning or expanding operators? 
• Would participants in the revenue assurance program be required to follow 
prescribed environmental practices? What would happen to CRP, conservation compliance, 
swampbuster, and sodbuster programs? 
• Would all crops be covered, including annual pasture and forage crops, fruits, 
vegetables, peanuts, tobacco, sugar, and cotton? 
• Would revenue guarantees apply to each crop individually or to the combined 
revenue from all crops? 
• How would the farm nonrecourse loan rate be established to avoid excessive stock 
accumulation without supply control? 
• What would be the cost of the program to taxpayers? 
Revenue Assurance Outcomes 
To better understand implications of revenue assurance, we calculated the level and 
variability of farm revenue for the U.S. as a whole from 1980 to 1992 using a five-year, 90% 
revenue assurance program instead of current commodity programs. A government 
assurance payment makes up the difference between current market revenue and 90 % of 
the past five-year moving average of market revenue per acre. 
Implications of coverage at the 70 % level proposed by the Iowa team could not be 
estimated from U.S. aggregate price, yield, acreage, and revenue date used herein because 
too much farm by farm variability averages out at the national level. Results in this paper 
underestimate actual costs of the assumed 90% coverage (though not necessarily of 70% 
coverage), and need to be supplemented by site-specific numbers. The numbers in this 
paper are relative aggregate indexes of impacts among commodities. If individual farm 
variation is proportional to national variation among farms, the results are a useful 
supplement to site-specific numbers which are difficult to aggregate. 
Estimates assume that any increase in output from less acreage reduction is offset by 
less incentive to produce under revenue assurance, so farm output is not changed. To avoid 
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moral hazard of insuring "neglected" or prevented planting, revenue is assured per acre. 
This is equivalent to calculating outcomes for a fixed acreage. This simplification recognizes 
that acreage needs to change considerably from year to year in response to markets, and 
it is inappropriate for revenue insurance to protect against such changes. 
Results of this revenue assurance program are shown in Table 1 as a percent of 
actual outcomes under existing commodity programs for that period. Overall revenue (value 
of production) and government payments under the revenue guarantee averaged 86 % of that 
from existing programs for the five commodities. Revenue under revenue assurance 
compared to actual commodity programs ranged from 70% for rice to 103% for soybeans. 
Outcomes also were calculated insuring value of total production rather than value of yield. 
As expected, revenue plus payments average higher-112 % for soybeans, for example, 
compared to 103 % in Table 1. 
Greater stability of revenue might compensate farmers for lower gross revenue. For 
the five crops, instability of market revenue plus government benefits under revenue 
assurance averaged only 45% of that under actual programs from 1980 to 1992 (Table 1). 
Revenue assurance achieved relatively less stabilization for soybeans than for other crops. 
By emphasizing income stabilization rather than enhancement, the revenue assurance 
program potentially saves taxpayers' dollars. Payments to producers under the revenue 
assurance could average as low as one-quarter of those from deficiency, diversion, disaster, 
storage, and net nonrecourse loans during the 1980-1982 period for the five crops considered 
(right column, Table 1). However, revenue assurance benefits would be distributed quite 
differently than current commodity program benefits. Soybeans is the big gainer based on 
the ratio of assurance payments to past payments. Soybean payments rise sharply because 
they began from a small base under the past program. Cotton payments especially drop 
because payments were sizable under past programs and because cotton yields are stabilized 
to some degree by irrigation. 
RA payments as a proportion of payments under past programs averaged 30 % for 
wheat compared to 14 % for com. The proportion is larger for wheat because of greater 
variability in wheat revenue per acre rather than because actual wheat payments were low 
in the 1980-92 period. 
The following numbers provide additional insight into crops covered by revenue 
assurance: 
Com 
Wheat 
Soybeans 
Cotton 
Rice 
Payment per Acre 
($/acre) 
9.62 
6.26 
3.92 
6.04 
38.67 
3 
Payment/Receipts 
(Percent) 
3.7 
5.3 
2.1 
1.7 
9.7 
• 
Table 1. Performance of a Five-Year, 90% Guarantee Revenue Assurance Program Relative 
to Actual Farm Programs for Selected Commodities from 1980 to 1992 
Commodity Revenue plus Government Payments per Acrea 
Average Variation (Standard Deviation) 
Government 
Payments8 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - (Percent of Actual) - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Com 82 39 14 
Wheat 82 48 30 
Soybeans 103 73 large 
Cotton 78 40 11 
Rice 70 37 27 
Five Crops 86 45 24 
Source: Basic data from U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
8lncludes deficiency, diversion, disaster, storage, and net loan payments per acre under 
actual programs, but only assurance payments under the revenue guarantee. 
Although the right-hand column of Table 1 indicated soybeans especially gained 
under revenue assurance versus past programs, the above numbers show that revenue 
assurance payments per acre and per dollar (percent) of receipts are greatest for rice. 
Wheat also receives considerable revenue payments compared to receipts. In short, of the 
major crops, wheat would be relatively favored by revenue assurance because of its 
variability and soybeans would be favored because it would be placed on an equal basis with 
other crops for program benefits. 
Revenue payments would be greatest in high risk areas, shifting benefits to drought-
prone regions such as the Great Plains, frost-prone areas of the North, and disease- and 
insect-prone areas such as the humid Southeast. Another reason for less average payment 
per unit of revenue in major producing areas is that bad weather causing low yields there 
has a strong macroeconomic impact on markets, raising prices and preserving revenue. The 
shifting of benefits to high risk areas would change the balance of political interests 
supporting programs and could threaten political viability of transfers to agriculture. 
Advantages of Revenue Assurance 
Although many questions remain unanswered, we attempt to summarize possible 
advantages and disadvantages of revenue assurance. In its favor, revenue assurance: 
• Recognizes that unstable income is a greatereconomic problem than is chronic low 
income to many commercial farm families. 
• Combines deficiency payments, FCI, and ad hoc disaster assistance into one program, 
4 
thereby diminishing chances for individual programs to work at cross purposes in stabilizing 
revenue. Treasury costs can be cut from current levels while reducing variation in farm 
income. 
• Recognizes that economic security of farmers depends on income stability, and not on 
price stability alone or output stability alone. RA recognizes that higher prices can go with 
lower production so that income is not necessarily changed by price and quantity instability. 
Programs independently insuring only price or only output can destabilize farm revenue. 
• Removes supply control programs that reduce production, limit agribusiness activity 
and exports, and inflate food prices. 
• Lets supply and demand set prices in the market (if nonrecourse loan rates are low 
enough), thereby enhancing global competitiveness while diminishing government central 
planning. 
Disadvantages of Revenue Assurance 
Among shortcomings, revenue assurance: 
• Would reduce overall farm revenue including payments compared to existing 
programs. Although benefits to farmers from less risk may not offset farm well-being loss 
from lower income and land price, taxpayers would gain from lower program costs. 
Revenue assurance might be viewed as a transition program to a greater market orientation. 
• Would provide incentive to widen variation in farm revenue. Greater assurance 
subsidies are received for variable income than for a stable income. Farmers would have 
incentive to use more risky production methods and other means to make their revenue vary 
from year to year. Such activity is a form of moral hazard sacrificing economic efficiency, 
real national income, and food security over the long term. 
• Would not necessarily address problems of unstable net farm household income. RA 
essentially would support accrual income rather than cash income. The difference arises 
mostly from changes in inventories. RA might discourage use of inventories to stabilize 
food marketings-at a loss in food security to consumers. Because net cash income must 
support current production costs, debt service, and essential family living expenses, many 
farmers might wish to have net cash income rather than accrual income stabilized. 
• Would expand output, thereby depressing prices and reducing average gross revenue. 
Of course, any farm policy reform phasing out ARPs would expand farm output. But 
compared to no government support of farm prices or incomes, revenue insurance would 
go beyond removing ARPs to subsidize production. Output would expand because economic 
incentives to produce would be enhanced by RA. Consequently, price and market revenue 
would fall. Output would expand among favored crops and in marginal areas, causing 
economic inefficiency and degrading the environment. 
• Would violate the spirit if not the letter of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GAIT). GA TT principles call for subsidies to be tied to historic rather than current 
production. Subsidies expanding output are to be attended by production controls. 
Subsidies are not to be used to expand export market share. RA violates these strictures. 
This and the preceding criticism would not apply if farmers themselves finance revenue 
insurance. 
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• Would not address revenue cycles. If RA is based on a five-year moving average 
of yields and prices, a cycle trough of five poor years would leave next year's revenue little 
protected. On the other hand, a revenue cycle peak of five unusually good years would form 
a history bringing insurance payments in the next normal year. A longer base for payments 
would not necessarily eliminate this problem. A moving average of, say, 10 years 
characterized by rapid inflation or technological changes would leave historic yield and price 
averages out of touch with current circumstances. 
• Would encourage farm consolidation and hence the trend to fewer, larger farms. 
Risk on small farms is dampened by off-farm income, but risk is a barrier to expansion of 
commercial farms. Less risk and elimination of payment limits encourages expansion of 
farms. Less risk also may encourage purchase of farm assets by nonfarmers. 
• Would tend to displace rather than build on current private risk management tools 
such asfatures, options, and hail insurance. A widely held policy principle is that government 
should not do what the private market can do. 
• Can be complex to administer, especially if insuring many commodities with separate 
coverage for each commodity. Revenue assurance covering one commodity would be easier 
to administer but would not stabilize overall farm income. Base production would need to 
be established for each commodity covered, including livestock, in a complete system. 
Determining revenue from each commodity would be an administrative burden and 
bedeviled by moral hazard. 
• Would reject the experience of Canada where some provinces using gross revenue 
insurance are dropping it. 
Canadian Experience 
Several provinces in Canada have offered a revenue insurance program called the 
Gross Revenue Insurance Plan (GRIP) since 1991 (see Simone in Harwood, p. 28). It is 
jointly funded by producers, provincial governments, and the federal government. It covers 
grains, oilseeds, and some specialty crops. 
Provisions differ among provinces. Some set coverage according to individual 
producer's yield; others set coverage according to area yield. Among provinces, insurance 
coverage ranges from 70% to 90% of long-term average revenue. 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba plan to abandon GRIP because of high cost and 
producer dissatisfaction. Canada is looking for a "whole farm" program that is less costly, 
GATI-legal, production neutral, and that includes livestock and processing as well as crops. 
One proposal is a net income stabilization account (NISA) operating through individual, 
interest-bearing funds jointly financed by producers and government. Payments from good 
years are drawn from accounts triggered by farm net income falling below a 5-year moving 
average or falling below a specified minimum income. 
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Possible Options to Improve Revenue Insurance 
The Canadian and other experiences suggests several options to improve farm 
revenue insurance schemes: 
• To reduce taxpayer cost, overproduction incentives, and export dumping, 
emphasize revenue insurance paid at least in part by producers rather than revenue 
assurance paid by government. 
• Replace individual crop revenue assurance with insurance to cover whole farm or 
family production expenses, total farm revenue, net income from farming, or net farm family 
income from all sources. The most basic need on most farms is to insure net income and 
not crop revenue. 
This latter option has the advantage of being operational off income tax returns, 
thereby vastly simplifying administration and reducing administrative cost. It could 
recognize that farm family economic security depends jointly on expenses, income from the 
farm, and income from off the farm. 
The program has a precedent in the Earned Income Credit (EIC) now available from 
the Internal Revenue Service to those with low earnings. The government supplements 
income of those who earn up to $23,050 per year. The EIC maximum payment, 
approximately $2,400 per year, is too small to stabilize income of farmers. The program, 
now designed to supplement income of the working poor, would need major revision to 
stabilize income of commercial agriculture. However, the design and administration of an 
income stabilization program from income tax data would be far simpler than doing so from 
individual crop and livestock enterprise data. 
One issue is whether an income stabilization program under an augmented EIC could 
be made available to farmers alone. If politics dictates that it be available to all 
occupations, high budget exposure could dictate heavy cost-sharing with participants 
voluntarily contributing to the fund in favorable years (with some matching by government 
to provide incentives), and drawing from the fund in lean years according to prescribed 
procedures. Cost-sharing also would reduce abuse of participants churning accounts to 
obtain maximum subsidies from turnover. The degree of cost-sharing by government might 
range from, say, 30% for families with low average income to 2 % for families with high 
average income. Accounts would earn interest, could help to finance the national debt, and 
could be used for retirement income as well as annual insurance. 
Conclusions 
Revenue insurance may seem to have the force of an idea whose time has come. But 
the Iowa and related revenue assurance proposals lose much of their appeal when closely 
scrutinized. Agricultural groups providing the political base for current commodity programs 
will be reluctant to abandon the comfortable policies of the past for complex revenue 
insurance schemes shifting the geographic and commodity incidence of benefits. Perhaps 
the most telling criticism is that revenue insurance has not worked well elsewhere. 
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To overcome many of the pitfalls of revenue insurance for individual crops, we 
propose a net income insurance plan designed around the federal income tax. That plan 
offers comprehensiveness and administrative simplicity. The earned income credit now 
supplementing earnings of the poor would need to be expanded, with participants voluntarily 
paying into a fund in favorable net income years (with some matching by government) and 
receiving paybacks in unfavorable years when income falls below a moving average or a 
threshold level. 
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